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Abstract 
The Cognitive Mobilization thesis (CM) claims that the increasing educational levels in post-
industrial societies bring about changes in the relationship between people's education and 
their participatory behaviour compared to the past. Younger, well-educated and more 
politically interested citizens are less likely to participate in political parties than poorly 
educated citizens, but more likely to join unconventional types of activist organisations. 
Using Italy as a test case, this study looks at whether the CM mechanism ought to be 
considered as a key factor shaping organizational participatory trends over time. Contrary to 
the CM thesis, we find that the highly educated continue to participate the most in political 
parties and that the gap between well and poorly educated in terms of their participation in 
activist associations does not become larger compared to the past. 
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1. Modernization and changing participatory behaviour 
Since the 1980s, in many Western democracies the relationship between political actors, 
political institutions and civil society has begun to come under pressure. Voters’ turnout and 
membership levels in hierarchical political associations of advanced industrial democracies 
are now suffering a crisis (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000, Franklin, 2004 and Van Biezen 
et al., 2012). This scenario, however, seems to be balanced by an expansion of new 
modalities of civil society participation. The most often used explanation in literature for 
these aggregate participatory trends is the theory of social modernization, and, in particular, 
the cognitive mobilization theory of citizens (hereafter CM) initially put forward by Inglehart, 
1977 and Inglehart, 1990a. Although not by any means the only existing explanation, this 
theory has enjoyed a large degree of success within the academic community especially 
following its influential developement by Dalton, 1984 and Dalton, 2002 and other authors ( 
Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995, Pharr and Putnam, 2000 and Norris, 1999). Questions about its 
validity have, however, been posed by findings from other studies that show results in 
contradiction with the CM hypotheses (e.g. Albright, 2009, Arzheimer, 2006, Marthaler, 
2008, Dassonneville et al., 2012 and Van Deth, 2000) or offer alternative interpretations of 
changes in participatory trends (e.g. Berglund et al., 2005; Katz and Mair, 1995). This article 
aims to contribute to this debate by first addressing the conceptual framework of CM in order 
to better clarify the mechanisms at work, and then by empirically testing whether CM is, 
alone, able to explain membership in organizations. 
The question key to this discussion is: why have participatory trends changed over time? 
Theories of social modernization argue that modernization and the transition to advanced 
industrial societies are processes that have brought about structural changes in various fields 
of society and politics. Yet, in terms of the inherently sociological theory of CM, the most 
significant and crucial change has been the sharp increase in education and information in the 
population, with a general improvement in citizens’ resources and skills (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 
295–297; Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p 524; Dalton, 2012). There are now better educated and 
more informed individuals than the past, and these individuals mostly belong to younger 
generations. According to advocates of this theory, one of the most relevant consequences of 
this compositional change in society is that these new individuals are more politically 
  
interested, but experience participation in politics and in civil society in radically different 
ways compared to older generations. As information costs decline, they tend to abandon 
hierarchical organizations such as political parties as they have become independent subjects. 
They tend to prefer participation in new types of socio-political organizations (hereafter 
activist associations) and bottom-up social movements, as well as participating in politics in 
more unconventional ways that allow them to deliberate thoughtfully on a wider set of 
political issues than the past ( Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Thanks to more educational 
resources in society, a process of top-down mobilization should have become ineffective and 
substituted by a new, mainly bottom-up, mobilization process. In short, taking the CM to its 
extreme implications would imply that, if educational levels had not increased in society, no 
major changes in the aggregate patterns of participation would have occurred. 
The CM is obviously not the sole existing explanation in literature trying to account for 
patterns of participation and mobilization. However, explanations based on CM have a 
different focus than accounts based, for instance, on party mobilization. Although such 
explanations may be related in the real world, they are conceptually distinct and are often 
tested as alternative theories. Relevant literature is therefore divided on what plays the key 
role in participatory mobilization (e.g. Dalton, 2012; Zelle, 1995). While CM may not be a 
comprehensive explanatory theory of changes in participatory trends that excludes any other 
explanation, but just a contribution in terms of insight into the changed relationship between 
education/cognitive skills and types of mobilization over time, its advocates argue that it is 
the spread of education and skills in society that played a key role in the participatory change 
in the Western world (Inglehart, 1977; Dalton 2012). 
Using Italy as a case-study, we first look at whether education is actually a key determinant 
of change at the aggregate level in different types of participation. We then critically explore 
the individual level mechanism of the thesis and how this fits the longitudinal evolution of 
participation. Far from challenging the validity of CM in its entirety, the emphasis of the 
study is on critically evaluating this theory in very specific aspects: a) we look at whether the 
relationship between education and different types of participation in Italy has changed and, 
if it did, whether it changed in the expected direction of CM; b) the focus of this paper is 
  
restricted to participation as reflected by membership in different types of organizations
1
: 
political parties and voluntary activist associations.
 2
 
Italy offers a suitable and interesting test case for CM in terms of participatory patterns, 
social modernization and data availability. This country has been characterized for a long 
time by political parties structured on the old model of the bureaucratic mass party, with 
relatively high levels of membership (Panebianco, 1982; Mair & van Biezen, 2001) but, at 
least until the early 1960s, also by scant social associationism (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Sani, 1980). This is to say that, for a long time, for many Italians participation in politics 
stemmed from their encapsulation in specific political subcultures, characterized by a 
partisan hold on many voluntary associations (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2000; 
Pizzorno, 1980). The participatory context of the early 1960s, however, started to change 
after Italy underwent a process of modernization and mass scholarization (1963–64), which 
was soon followed by an increase of participation in voluntary activist associations as well as 
in social movements. Although a sort of depoliticization of society has been in place since the 
late 1970s, it was only in the early 1990s with the end of the First Republic, when the 
political system was completely substituted following a series of scandals, that party 
participation dramatically dropped. Moreover, crucial for the aim of this study, modernization 
of Italian society happened relatively late compared to other Western countries. This provides 
an unprecedentedly large amount of data available for investigating the evolution of 
organizational participation over time, which accounts, at least partially, for the dramatic 
change of the Italian social context over almost a 40 year period. 
In this paper, following a review of studies on the effects of education on participation and on 
the rise of CM theories, survey data are carefully harmonized and merged from different 
points in time since the early 1970s in order to cover as wider time period as possible (1972–
2006). We investigate whether or not the crisis of participation in Italian mass parties, as well 
as the growth of activist organization participation can be satisfactorily explained by social 
change and, more specifically, by changes in the educational composition of society, as the 
CM posits. A first set of hypotheses looks at participatory dynamics at the aggregate level. A 
                                                          
1
 Social modernization and CM has been investigated by looking at different phenomena: electoral behaviour 
and volatility (Zelle, 1995), party membership and partisanship (Dalton, 2007, 2012; Barton and Doring, 1986) 
and social movements (Inglehart, 1990b), to name a few. 
2
 Although the latter are often connected to social movements, participation in social movements is not directly 
included in the analysis here. Even though participation in social movements is one of the core CM effects on 
political participation, just as participation in organizational participation is, it is equally as vital to investigate 
each of these aspects in its own right. 
  
second set of hypotheses tests the CM mechanism that connects education and participation 
at the individual level, taking into account a moderator effect of social change on 
participatory trends. Findings show that the relationship between education and 
organizational participation in Italy has not changed in the direction expected by CM neither 
for political parties nor for activist associations. 
2. Education, system support and system criticism 
Early studies of political behaviour demonstrated that education has a direct positive impact 
on political and social participation, by enhancing citizens’ psychological engagement and by 
providing them with the cultural instruments necessary to orientate themselves in the 
complex political world (Hyman and Wright, 1979, Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 
2004 and Weakliem, 2002). On this line, the low levels of education in Italian society in the 
late 1950s were considered responsible for a lack of political skills, necessary to become a 
participatory citizen (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963). Over the past 50 years, however, Italian 
society has expanded rapidly and significantly in terms of the distribution of educational 
levels in the population. In the 1991 census the ratio between the proportion of citizens that 
had completed secondary school level or more was up by 4 to 1 compared to 1961. In 2006, 
the educational levels of cohorts indicate that almost 30% of people born between 1915 and 
1924 have no school title, while more than half of the youngest cohorts have obtained a 
secondary school diploma and more than one in ten holds a university degree (Checchi et al., 
2006). According to the early studies of participatory behaviour, a progressive increase in 
educational levels in society, such as the one that Italy experienced, should have led to 
averagely higher individual resources and skills, together with lower feelings of alienation 
from politics or society. This, in turn, should have increased citizens participation both in 
political and civil society associations (Verba et al., 1995). Yet, on the contrary, although 
participation has always interested a relatively small percentage of the population as in other 
Western countries, Italy has faced both a decrease of its relatively high aggregate levels of 
partisan conventional political participation and an increase of unconventional participation 
in activist associations over time. 
This participatory trend evolution appears to be more in line with a new theory that started to 
gain popularity in the 1970s and that put forward the idea of a changed relationship between 
education and politics because of a compositional change of society (Inglehart, 1977, 
Inglehart, 1990a, Dalton, 1984 and Dalton, 2002). The term ‘cognitive mobilization’ was 
  
originally introduced by Inglehart to refer to ‘the increasingly wide dissemination of the skills 
necessary to cope with an extensive political community’, defined, within the broader context 
of modernization, as ‘the very core of the process’ of social mobilization (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 
295–297). The author crucially incorporated CM within his framework and emphasized the 
change of values that allows individuals to increase their interest in politics, while becoming 
more autonomous from conventional hierarchical organizations and switching their 
preference towards unconventional forms of participation. CM claims that these changes are 
established in societies through a process of generational change. Since new generations are 
better educated and live in a society averagely more educated and richer in resources than the 
past, while becoming more politically interested, they also become less willing to accept a 
hierarchic and inclusive relation with politics that big bureaucratic organizations were able to 
offer them. For this reason new participatory demands arise (Inglehart, 1990a, pp. 335–370). 
Elaborating on Inglehart, Dalton (1984) utilized the concept of CM to attempt to explain 
partisan dealignment and declining levels of party identification in advanced industrial 
democracies ( Dalton, 2012, Dalton, 2013 and Dalton, 2014). He showed that higher levels of 
education in society lead to an increase in the number of party-independent citizens. Through 
education, more people, particularly among younger generations, are cognitively mobilized 
since they acquire the skills and resources that increase their ability to process political 
information and to make informed decisions, becoming less dependent on party cues. 
According to Dalton, the impact of increasing CM on politics is significant only when skills 
(i.e. education) are combined with a motivation (i.e. political interest) to apply these skills to 
politics. At the aggregate level, indeed, the amount of a new type of non-partisan citizens - 
non-aligned but also better educated and politically sophisticated - seem to increase over 
time, increasing volatility in the electorate (Dalton, 2007 and Dalton, 2012). 
Many other authors have incorporated the increasing cognitive skills of citizens into their 
studies in order to explore the changing relationship between citizens and political 
institutions. They found, for instance, that better education and more political competence are 
associated with being more critical towards the (conventional) political system, and that this 
in turn lead to the selection of other participation modalities (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995, 
Pharr and Putnam, 2000 and Norris, 1999). Thus, what supporters of the CM theory propose 
is a multi-faceted universally valid approach originated by changes in educational levels of 
societies that is in sharp contrast to the past, when education was thought to promote rather 
than oppose system support. 
  
3. Disentangling the mechanism of the CM 
Despite the prevalence and crystallization of CM in comparative literature on political 
behaviour, there are in fact two major challenges to the unconditional adequacy of the theory. 
First, critical voices point to inconsistencies in the empirical support for the theory across 
studies. At the aggregate level, criticism of Dalton's model comes, for instance, from the 
empirical evidence that in some countries party attachment has not dropped much, and has 
even risen with society's modernization (Albright, 2009). But even when the aggregate 
development of participatory trends are consistent with what CM theory predicts, as in the 
evolution of the participatory trends in Italy, this does not necessarily prove that the main 
mechanism at work is the one assumed by it. CM theory is indeed based on some micro-level 
hypotheses, which have occasionally already been contested in literature (Barton and Doring, 
1986, Arzheimer, 2006 and Huber et al., 2005). Van Deth (2000) for instance shows that 
cognitively mobilized people have lower, not higher, levels of political involvement because 
their scope of alternative action widens, and politics becomes less salient. The main criticism, 
however, comes from studies that prove that, at the individual level, highly sophisticated 
citizens are more, not less, likely to be partisan. Loss of party identity is indeed encountered 
among groups with low levels of education and political interest (Dassonneville et al., 2012, 
Arzheimer, 2006, Marthaler, 2008, Ohr et al., 2009, Albright, 2009 and Berglund et al., 
2005). Although in the case of Germany this has been disproved by a later work by Dalton 
(2014), the issue remains controversial and casts doubts on CM as key causal mechanism for 
dealignment. 
From a different perspective, Berglund et al. (2005) show that, by focussing on individual 
characteristics, the systemic relationship between contextual factors and party identification 
is not sufficiently accounted for, since party polarization may be responsible for a rise in 
partisanship. On the same line, Huber et al. (2005) hold that the characteristics of the political 
context, such as the nature of the competition between parties, may influence individuals 
propensity to form party attachment more than changes in the social structure do. Moreover, 
Zelle (1995) shows that volatility is determined by the degree of political dissatisfaction in 
the electorate, which is in turn likely to be caused by macro stimuli such as historic events, 
economic conditions, or the like, rather than by CM. Finally, change in participation has been 
explained as a logical consequence of the crisis in the structure of mass-bureaucratic parties 
in all Western countries (Katz and Mair, 1995; Ignazi, 2012). Although testing these 
  
alternative theories against each other could provide an explanation of which mechanism 
better accounts for change, in this article we specifically focus on the validity of CM 
hypotheses because of the importance of investigating the allegedly changed role of 
education for participation. 
An important issue to address is that no clear enough indication is given in literature on what 
exactly the CM mechanism implies. The concept of CM has been used to investigate different 
political attitudes, values and phenomena, with slightly different definitions and 
operationalization each time, and to test different mechanisms. Yet, as the name of the theory 
recalls, the core notion of CM should be represented by its cognitive aspect and by the fact 
that a change in cognition is the basis for the self-mobilization of citizens. Thus, as other 
authors have also pointed out, CM refers first and foremost to the increase of skills (i.e. 
education) in society and should be operationalized as such. It can be argued whether 
involvement (e.g. interest) in politics could be considered part of CM or as a consequence of 
increased skills. But CM certainly does not include in its definition a change of values 
towards politics, or a decrease of party attachment, which may rather be considered as its 
expected consequences, but not as constitutional elements of the concept itself (see Berglund 
et al., 2005 and Barton and Doring, 1986). There is also the need to account more explicitly 
for the fact that CM operates at two different levels. At the macro level, modernization and 
mass scholarization have led to an increase of information and of educated citizens, changing 
a collective property of a society, which can be called its ‘educational composition’. In turn, 
living in a society that is averagely more educated and has more cognitive resources than the 
past makes it easier for better-educated citizens to become more capable of independently 
processing the information they receive; and with less need for guidance from traditional 
parties, they start to feel at odds with the old rituals of participation. Thus, CM expects that 
the ‘educational composition’ of a society, that has changed towards better education over 
time, has a moderating effect on the relationship between individual levels of education 
(independent variable), and participation in a) political parties or b) activist associations 
(dependent variables). As a result of this, better-educated people, particularly of younger 
generations, should participate less in political parties and more in unconventional activist 
associations (Dalton, 1984 and Dalton, 2002). This is graphically displayed in Fig. 1. 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. The CM mechanism 
As we show below, it is unquestionable that the level of education and information has been 
dramatically increasing in Italian society since the 1960s. Yet, CM conditions can only be 
considered satisfied when this rise of education has changed the relationship between being 
more educated and participating. More precisely, a) if there has been a change from a positive 
to a negative relationship between education and the participation in conventional politics 
over time and in younger, better educated generations; b) if the gap between the likelihood of 
participation in bottom-up activist associations of better-educated citizens, who participate 
more, and poorly educated citizens, who participates less, becomes larger over time and in 
younger, better educated generations. This study investigates whether this has been the case. 
If not, it becomes hard to justify the CM as a key mechanism at work to explain trends in 
organizational participations, and a need for expanding CM or to look for alternative 
explanations would arise. 
4. Research design and CM expectations 
This study relies on a merged file with five repeated cross-section studies of Italian National 
Election Studies (Itanes) and seven of Standard Eurobarometer (Eb), covering a period of 
almost 40 years (1972–2006).3 In order to test the CM mechanisms, the study proceeds in two 
steps. First, we test whether the CM thesis is a suitable explanation at the aggregate level by 
investigating the participatory trend over time, assuming constant educational level in society 
over the period studied. Then, we test the CM thesis by looking at the effects of education on 
participation at different levels of educational composition of society over time. 
                                                          
3
 Merged dataset (total N 18041): Itanes 1972, 1985, 1996, 2001, 2006; Standard Eb 1983(19); 1987(28); 
1988(30); 1989(31); 1990(34); 1991(35); 1998(49); activist measures are present in 7 survey years. 
Individual 
Education 
b) Bottom-up 
Participation 
(Activist Associations) 
Educational Composition  
of Society a) Hierarchical 
Participation 
(Political Parties) 
  
With the aim of reconstructing the country's participatory trends, organizational participation 
is chosen as the dependent variable. More specifically, we account for a) hierarchical political 
associations, defined here as political parties, and for b) any unconventional political 
organizations, defined here as voluntary single-issue activist associations, often related to 
social movements,
4
 such as associations dealing with environment, human rights, peace, and 
the like. Using survey sources that differ in the complexity of their measures, organizational 
participation is operationalized through the most common measure found across waves: 
membership in associations ((1) member; (0) not member). Measuring membership not only 
provides an extended series of participation measures, but also allows for homogenous 
questions to be asked across the surveys. Typically, the form in which membership is asked 
to respondents is the following: ‘Are you a member of … a political party? … an (activist) 
association’.5 
The main independent variable considered is education. We look at education in two different 
ways: a) education at the individual level and b) the educational composition of society. 
Although we believe education to be at the core of the concept of cognitive mobilization, in 
order to make the results of our analyses comparable to previous operationalisations, Dalton 
(1984: 267) we construct an individual level index combining formal level of education of 
respondents (proxy for skills acquisition) with interest in politics (proxy for political 
involvement). Those scoring high on this index are those who are both highly educated and 
have the motivation to deal with the complexities of politics on their own. We refer to this 
index as education/interest (hereafter EI). 
6
 
In similar ways, educational composition of society is defined as the average level of 
education, information, cognitive skills and political interest in society at a certain point in 
time. Given the approximate linearity of education increase in society over the years and 
                                                          
4
 This is not necessarily the case for all organizations, but we rely on average features of these broad 
categorization types. 
5 Since the number and type of measured activist associations vary across waves, the focus is directed only on 
the association types that we can find in most surveys: environmental issues, animal rights associations and 
human rights associations. This may slightly reduce the scope of the analyses, but it has the advantage of 
covering an unprecedentedly long time-span to test the CM. 
6
 Following Dalton (1984: 267), the index is an additive combination of education and general interest in 
politics. The respondent's educational level was coded according to the degree obtained by the respondent at the 
time of the interview, and to the correspondent average age in Italy: (1) low education (primary to lower 
secondary - Itanes; 6/15 y. - EB); (2) lower to higher secondary - - Itanes; 16/19 y. - EB); (3) university - Itanes; 
20+ y. - EB). Political interest was coded: (1) not at all, (2) not much, (3) to some extent/a great deal). These 
two questions were added together to yield a six point index (2-6). All analyses have also been replicated using 
education only. Results go in similar directions as those shown in the text. 
  
across cohorts, the proxy of time is used and defined here in two distinct ways. First, we 
account for change over time of society as a whole, operationalized through survey-years 
7
 
(1972–2006 for party membership and 1983–2006 for activist associations).8 Second, we also 
account for changes in the educational composition of cohorts. We categorize the sample into 
seven generations, each covering a period of 10-years, by accounting also for the main 
political events occurring when respondents turned 18 
9
: Fascism (until 1943), the Cold War 
(1944–1953), the Italian Economic Boom (1954–1963), the Italian (and worldwide) mass 
demonstrations of Sixty-Eight (1964–1973), national Terrorism (1974–1983), Tangentopoli 
(i.e. Bribery City Scandal, 1984–1993) and Berlusconism (1994–2006) (see Corbetta and 
Ceccarini, 2010). The generation before Sixty-Eight (i.e. Economic Boom) is taken as a 
reference category because it is considered to be a crucial turning point in Italian politics. Not 
only is the cohort of Sixty-Eight, on average, much more educated than previous generations, 
but it was also socialized during a climate of great contestation of the conventional political 
system. It should then be the first to have experienced the CM mechanisms: better educated 
(and more politically interested) people belonging to this birth cohort (and later generations), 
should be less likely than past generations to participate in political parties and more likely to 
participate in activist associations. 
Logistic regressions are used and the influence of the most important socio-demographic 
determinants of participation in Italy is also controlled for in the models.
10
 Including age, 
period and cohorts (APC) at the same time within the same model leads to the well-known 
issue of linear dependency (Glenn, 1976). We address it by using clustered standard error for 
the variable we exclude from the model (either period or cohorts).
11
  
                                                          
7
 Given the low number of time points used in the analyses, using objective educational aggregate levels would 
not provide better information. Both variables would provide qualitative rather than quantitative information 
(also making multilevel analysis not advisable). Since educational changes have been positively and linearly 
increasing over time, the best proxy to capture educational levels in a given year are survey years. 
8
 (1972), 1983, (1985), 1987, (1988, 1989), 1990, (1991), 1996, 1998, 2001, 2006. 
9
 A cohort generally refers to a group of people of the same age (i.e. went to school in the same years). Citizens 
belonging to different cohorts, however, do not differ only in terms of their average educational levels, but also 
in terms of the social climate of their political socialization, which has crucial implications for their participatory 
behaviour (Mannheim, 1964; Corbetta, 2002; Bellucci and Segatti, 2010). Since in this study the effect of 
political events cannot be disentangled from the effects of the educational composition of society and that the 
participatory revolution of the 1960s coincides with the educational revolution of society, political generations 
are accounted for when choosing cohorts. 
10
 A dummy for survey type is introduced when looking at cohorts effects (Table 2 and Table 3b). All models 
have also been replicated using Itanes survey data only. Similar results than those shown are found. 
11
 For a review of APC problem and proposed solutions see Neundord and Niemi's (2014) special issue in this 
journal. Although far from having reached a consensus on its validity (e.g. Bell and Jones, 2014), cross-
classified multi-level approach is the most used approach to solve APC (Yang and Land, 2006 and Yang and 
Land, 2008). For the purpose of this article, given that we deal with one single country and we do not have 
  
 
5. CM at the aggregate level 
With the aim of informing the discussion, educational trends over time as registered at 
Census (1951–2011) (Fig. 2), as well as aggregate participatory trends (1972–2006) of 
membership in different organizations as measured in the merged dataset, are displayed in 
graphic form (Fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 2. Society Educational level (%) over time, 1950e2010. Source: Censis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enough cases at the second level, we follow the clustered standard error choice by Pop-Eleches & Tucker within 
the same special issue. We get similar results than those shown when running hierarchical models. 
  
 
Fig. 3. Membership (%) in political parties and activist (environment/animal rights/human 
rights) associations over time, 1972–2006. 
Note: Own elaboration of Itanes and EB data. Linear fit tendency lines indicate the participatory trend (and 
confidence intervals) over time. A vertical dotted line indicates the change from the First to the Second Italian 
Republic. 
The general picture of Italian participatory phenomenon provided by the graph is roughly in 
line with CM expectations: 1) educational levels have consistently increased over time, 
moving from 6% of lower secondary degree to 30%, from 3% of upper secondary degree to 
30%, and from 1 to 11% of university degree in 50 years; 2) averagely higher levels of 
education across society are associated with lower levels of party participation and higher 
levels of activist association participation. Yet, we see that participation in political parties in 
Italy was still quite high (around 9%) during the whole of the First Republic, and started to 
decrease in the mid-1990s, dropping to around 4% in the first decade of the XXI century. 
Participation in activist associations has instead been constantly growing, moving from less 
than 2% in the early 1980s to more than 7% in 2006.
12
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 Party Membership (in %): 1972: 9.42, 1983: 7.13, 1985: 5.62, 1987: 6.65, 1988: 10.72, 1989: 8.75, 1990: 
8.32, 1991: 9.03, 1996: 6.15, 1998: 4.47, 2001: 3.66; 2006: 4.51. Activist Membership (in %): 1983: 1.86%; 
1987: 3.48; 1990: 5.78, 1996: 4.54; 1998: 6.81; 2001: 7.92; 2006: 7.51. The percentages of party membership 
  
The first step of the analysis is a reasoning at the aggregate level, which tests whether the 
educational composition of society is actually a key determinant of the change of 
participatory patterns. In the CM model it is assumed that if the educational composition of 
society had remained constant over time, that is if the Italian society of 2006 were on average 
equally as educated as the society of the early 1970s, participation in political parties as well 
as in activist associations would have stayed constant over the years (H1a). In the same way, 
it is assumed that if political generations were on average equally educated, younger 
generations would participate in political and activist associations as much as older 
generations (H1b). Thus, after controlling for the distribution of EI over time (H1a) and 
across political cohorts (H1b), overall participation rates in both hierarchical and bottom-up 
associations in Italian society, over time, should become (almost) constant (H1a) and the 
generation of Sixty-Eight and younger generations ought to participate in associations 
(almost) as much as previous generations (H1b). This is empirically tested by running logistic 
regressions using association membership as the dependent variable and survey years (H1a) 
or political cohorts (H1b) as the main independent variables in a first baseline model while 
controlling also for levels of education and political interest (i.e. holding EI constant) in a 
second model. We then report the predicted probabilities of participation in different 
association type for average levels of education (and political interest). 
13
 
Over time odds ratio of party membership (A) and activist associations (B) with (1) and 
without (2) the influence of EI are shown in Table 1. Odds ratio indicates the probability of 
an event occurring divided by the probability of the same event not occurring. Controlling for 
other variables in the baseline model, the odds of becoming a party member after a unit 
increase in survey years tend to be significantly lower (0.97). And these are even lower when 
levels of EI are controlled for (0.96). This means that, instead of becoming constant (i.e. not 
significant) as expected by CM (H1a), party membership is significantly lower over time 
(A1), and is even lower after controlling for average levels of education (and political 
interest) in society (A2). In fact, looking at predicted probabilities of becoming a party 
member for average levels of EI over time, we can see there is a decline from 11.6% in 1972 
to 2.7% in 2006. In the same way, the odds of becoming a member of an activist association 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reported by different surveys have been validated with figures officially reported by the parties themselves (van 
Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012). The two measures report very similar membership levels (Pearson 
correlation 0.97 for 4 points in time in different decades). 
13
 It is not possible to run the analysis at the aggregate level because there are not enough cases. Analyses have 
been replicated with the variable education harmonized accounting for the fact that mass scholarization changed 
the social and economic significance of Italian educational qualifications before and after the reform law of 
1963–64 (Corbetta and Ceccarini, 2010). Results are not substantively different to those shown. 
  
are significantly higher every year by 7% in both models (B1 and B2). Whilst predicted 
probabilities of becoming an activist organization member for average levels of EI move 
from 2.1% in 1983 to 9.3% in 2006. 
 
Table 1. Odds Ratio of Membership in Political Parties (A) and Activist Associations (B) 
over Years after controlling for the Education/Interest Index, 1972-2006 – H1a 
H1a A. Political Parties B. Activist Associations 
Survey Years 0.97(0.01)*** 0.96(0.01)*** 1.07(0.01)*** 1.07(0.01)*** 
Education/Interest 
index (EI) (ref: low) 
- 1.89(0.07)*** - 1.52(0.04)*** 
Gender (ref: female) 0.31(0.04)*** 0.39(0.04)*** 1.02(0.10) 1.18(0.12) 
Age (centred) 1.00(0.01) 1.01(0.01)* 0.99(0.00)* 1.00(0.00) 
Geo-political Areas (ref: North-West)  (ref: North)  
   North-east 0.90(0.11) 0.91(0.12) - - 
   Red belt 1.58(0.15)*** 1.57(0.15)*** - - 
   Centre 1.23(0.07)*** 1.13(0.05)** 0.80(0.12) 0.78(0.12) 
   South 1.21(0.11)* 1.25(0.11)** 0.77(0.06)** 0.80(0.06)** 
Survey (ref: Itanes)     
  Standard EB 1.34(0.11)*** 0.99(0.09) 1.27(0.20) 1.17(0.21) 
Constant 1.16e+22 
(1.56e+23)*** 
6.25e+37 
(7.58e+38)*** 
7.00e-57 
(1.82e-55)*** 
7.28e-61 
(2.01e-59)*** 
Log PseudoL -4072.10 -3814.94 -2533.11 -2461.00 
N 18127  18041 11427  11387 
Note: Own elaboration of Itanes and EB data. Odds Ratios are displayed. Clustered standard error for political 
cohorts in parenthesis. 
a
 p≤ .10; * p≤ .05; ** p≤ .01; *** p≤ .001 
 
Moving to the next hypothesis, changes over time are explored in greater detail, by looking at 
different political cohorts. Table 2 shows the odds ratio of party membership (A), and activist 
associations (B) over cohorts. Also in this case, no constant trends (H1b) are found in moving 
from the baseline model (1) to the model in which EI is controlled for (2). The odds ratios for 
party membership are increasingly lower than the reference category (i.e. Economic Boom) 
after the generation of Sixty Eight in the baseline model (A1) and (even more so) starting 
from the generation of Sixty Eight after (A2) controlling for EI. Whereas, they are 
increasingly and significantly higher for activist association membership starting from the 
generation of Sixty-Eight in the baseline model (B1) and (even more so) after it when 
controlling for EI (B2). Predicted probabilities for average EI levels move from 14.5% of the 
  
oldest generation to 1% of the youngest generation in the case of party members, and from 
1.1% to 17.6% in the case of activist organization membership. 
 
Table 2. Odds Ratio of Membership in Political Parties (A) and Activist Associations (B) 
over Political Cohorts after controlling for the Education/Interest Index – H1b 
H1b A. Political Parties B. Activist Associations 
Political Cohorts (ref: 3. Economic Boom)   
   1.Fascism 1.21(0.17) 1.83(0.30)*** 0.26(0.10)*** 0.26(0.11)*** 
   2.Cold war 0.98(0.10)  1.28(0.12)** 0.73(0.12)
a
 0.78(0.14) 
   4.Sixty-eight 0.88(0.11)  0.69(0.09)** 1.38(0.26)
a
 1.30(0.23) 
   5.Terrorism 0.48(0.09)*** 0.33(0.07)*** 2.36(0.78)** 2.38(0.81)* 
   6.Tangentopoli 0.25(0.06)*** 0.15(0.04)*** 3.66(1.66)** 3.83(1.85)** 
   7.Berlusconism 0.16(0.06)*** 0.10(0.04)*** 4.80(3.23)* 5.45(4.09)* 
Education/Interest 
index (EI) (ref: low) 
- 1.84(0.09)*** - 1.52(0.06)*** 
Gender (ref: female) 0.31(0.03)*** 0.39(0.03)*** 1.02(0.07) 1.18(0.08)** 
Age (centred) 0.98(0.01)** 0.97(0.00)*** 1.04(0.01)** 1.04(0.02)** 
Geo-political Areas (ref: North-West)  (ref: North)  
   North-east 0.90(0.08) 0.91(0.08)   
   Red belt 1.58(0.18)*** 1.58(0.17)***   
   Centre 1.23(0.14) 1.14(0.13) 0.80(0.05)*** 0.78(0.06)*** 
   South 1.22(0.13) 1.26(0.11)** 0.78(0.08)** 0.81(0.10)
a
 
Survey (ref: Itanes)     
  Standard EB 1.30(0.17)* 0.96(0.16)  1.03(0.24) 0.94(0.27) 
Constant 0.12(0.02) *** 0.02(0.00)*** 0.04(0.01)*** 0.01(0.00)*** 
Log PseudoL -4039.60 -3797.84 -2538.66 -2466.63 
N 18127 18041 11427 11387 
Note: Own elaboration of Itanes and EB data. Odds Ratios are displayed. Clustered standard error for survey-
years in parenthesis. 
a
 p≤ .10; * p≤ .05; ** p≤ .01; *** p≤ .001 
 
Thus, on the whole, the findings of both hypotheses H1a and H1b seem not to corroborate the 
CM thesis of education as a key determinant of change. If the average levels of education 
(and political interest) in society had stayed constant over the years and across cohorts, 
participation in political parties would still have become lower over time, while participation 
in activist associations would still have grown over time. In other words, there is no evidence 
that the change in the educational composition of Italian society has been a key determinant 
influencing participatory changes, as expected by CM. This is not (yet) to say that the 
mechanism at work in the relationship between education and participation is not going in the 
direction claimed by CM. It may be, as the CM thesis claims, that people with high levels of 
EI participate less in political parties and more in activist associations compared to the past. 
  
However, it could be that it is mainly people with low levels of EI that are participating less 
in political parties and more in activist associations compared to the past. It could also be that 
everybody participates less in political parties and more in activist associations compared to 
the past, but the relationship between people with high and low levels of EI remains 
unchanged. These three mechanisms are all compatible with the results of the previous 
hypotheses, because in both cases party participation drops and activist participation 
increases. 
 
6. CM at the individual level 
In order to know which mechanism models the relationship between the education/interest 
index and levels of participation we need to take a closer look at it by investigating the 
moderating effect that society's educational composition as a contextual property has on the 
individual level relationship between EI and participation. Moderation is characterized 
statistically as an interaction between the variables of interest. The CM thesis assumes that, 
when the educational composition of society changes, the change of participatory behaviour 
should be particularly pronounced among well-educated citizens. Thus, with higher average 
levels of education in society; a) well-educated (and politically interested) citizens should be 
less willing to participate in political parties than poorly educated citizens are (negative 
relationship of education); and b) they should be more attracted to join activist associations 
than poorly educated citizens are, compared to the past (increasingly larger positive gap) 
(H2a). Furthermore, the CM thesis also posits that it is particularly the well-educated (and 
politically interested) citizens belonging to younger generations that should have changed 
their participatory behaviour compared to older generations. As besides experiencing general 
higher levels of education in society, the well-educated members of younger generations also 
belong to better-educated cohorts. Consequentially, the likelihood of the cognitively 
mobilized (high educated and politically interested) members of younger (better-educated) 
generations joining political parties ought to be lower than the not cognitively mobilized. 
Whereas, for joining activist associations not only should this likelihood be higher for the 
well-educated (and politically interested) but also the likelihood gap between the two groups 
should be larger in younger generations (H2b). 
 
 
  
 
Table 3. Model with Interaction between EI and Years on Political Party (A) and Activist 
Association (B) Membership– H2a & H2b (Log Odds) 
H2a 
A. Political 
Parties 
B. Activist 
Associations 
H2b 
A. Political 
Parties 
B. Activist 
Associations 
Survey 
Years   
(ref: 1972)   (ref: 1983) Political Cohorts (ref: 3. Econ. Boom) 
    1983 -0.44(0.27) -    1. Fascism  0.33(0.14)* -1.24 (0.39)*** 
    1985 -0.61(0.10)*** -    2. Cold War  0.11(0.09) -0.33(0.13)* 
    1987 -0.61(0.33)
 a
 0.46(0.21)*    4. Sixty-Eight -0.28(0.23)*  0.37(0.13)** 
    1988 -0.00(0.25) -    5. Terrorism -0.97(0.26)***  0.99(0.21)*** 
    1989 -0.38(0.24) -    6. Tangentopoli -1.73(0.21)***  1.45(0.29)*** 
    1990 -0.13(0.25) 1.02(0.26)***    7. Berlusconism -2.05(0.30)***  1.79(0.46)*** 
    1991 -0.43(0.23)
 a
 -     
    1996 -0.76(0.17)*** 0.88(0.23)***    
    1998 -1.29(0.27)*** 1.19(0.21)***    
    2001 -1.29(0.20)*** 1.57(0.19)***    
    2006 -1.12(0.25)*** 1.50(0.20)***    
EI index 
(ref: low) 
1.11(0.39)** 1.22(0.67)
a
  1.04(0.15)*** 1.28(0.33)*** 
EI # Years  
  
 EI # Cohorts   
         # 1983  0.35(0.55) -         # Fascism 0.01(0.24) -0.70(0.99) 
         # 1985 -0.12(0.29) -         # Cold War -0.30 (0.27)  0.39(0.37) 
         # 1987 -0.10(0.48) -0.10(0.80)         # Sixty-Eight 0.28(0.19) -0.33(0.40) 
         # 1988  0.20(0.49) -         # Terrorism 0.42(0.19)* -0.46(0.41) 
         # 1989  0.11(0.42) -         # Tangentop 0.63(0.19)*** -0.39(0.26) 
         # 1990 -0.47(0.61)  0.06(0.68)         # Berluscon 0.57(0.45) -0.38(0.51) 
         # 1991 -0.25(0.29) -    
         # 1996  0.25(0.35) -0.34(0.71)     
         # 1998  0.65(0.53)  0.02(0.71)    
         # 2001  0.56(0.29)* -0.38(0.68)    
         # 2006  0.91(0.38)* -0.21(0.56)    
Gender  
(ref: female) 
-1.07(0.13)***  0.10(0.10)  -1.07(0.09)*** 0.11(0.06)
 a
 
Age(centred)  0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.00)*  -0.02(0.01)*** 0.04(0.01)*** 
Geo-political  
Areas (ref: North-West/North)   
   
    North East -0.97(0.13) -  -0.10(0.09) - 
    Red Belt  0.48(0.09)*** -   0.47(0.11)*** - 
    Centre  0.17(0.05)*** -0.23(0.15)   0.17(0.12) -0.23(0.08)** 
    South   0.20(0.09)* -0.24(0.07)***   0.21(0.09)* -0.23(0.11)* 
Constant -2.04(0.21)*** -4.02(0.19)***  -1.07(0.09)*** -3.44(0.20)*** 
Log PseudoL -3907.37 -2468.90 Log PseudoL -3912.39 -2483.93 
N 18041 11387  18041 11387 
  
Note: Own elaboration of Itanes and EB data. Log Odds are displayed. Clustered standard error in parenthesis 
(for cohorts in H2a and for survey-years in H2b). 
a
 p≤ .10; * p≤ .05; ** p≤ .01; *** p≤ .001 
As before, logistic regressions are run using association membership as the dependent 
variable, and average educational society level, expressed as survey years (H2a) or political 
cohorts (H2b) together with a dummy variable for the individual level EI index 
14
 as the main 
independent variables. This time, however, an interaction between time (survey years or 
political cohorts) and EI is added. Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients (log odds) of 
the model for participation in political parties (A) and activist associations (B). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Predictive margins of CM for political party and activist association membership, 
1972–2006 – H2a. 
 
We first look at the two models on the left of Table 3 (H2a). As we can see, in both cases, the 
effect of EI in the reference year is positive and significant. However, only few interactions 
coefficients between EI and survey years are significant and only for the model of party 
                                                          
14
 EI is an index that combines education and political interest as explained above. Values of 4 or less are treated 
as low cognitive mobilization. 
  
membership. Results are illustrated more directly by looking visually at predictive margins. 
Fig. 4 shows that, although everybody tends to be less likely to become a party member over 
time, well-educated (and politically interested) people tend to be more likely to participate 
than citizens with low EI. In the past as in more recent years, people with higher education 
and political interest tend to have (similarly) higher chances of becoming a party member 
within each survey year than people with low EI. If anything can be noticed from the figure, 
it is that this difference tends to be larger in the last decade. Whilst in terms of activists 
associations, the well-educated tend to participate more. However, statistically, the gap 
between the two educational levels remains almost constant over time, despite society being 
averagely more scholarized. 
Overall, this suggests that the effect of EI on party participation remains positive and 
predominantly constant over time for membership in both association types. This contradicts 
the CM because, in the case of party membership, the effect of education (and political 
interest) does not become negative in more recent years, while in the case of activist 
membership the likelihood gap of participation between high and low EI does not become 
higher over time. Thus, in both cases, the CM expectations are not met. 
 
  
Fig. 5 Predictive margins of CM for political party and activist association membership, 
cohorts – H2b. 
We now move to the two models on the right of Table 3 (H2b). Also in this case the effect of 
EI in the reference cohort is positive and significant, whereas only a few interactions 
coefficients between EI and cohorts are significant and only for the model of party 
membership. Also in this case, results are illustrated more directly by looking visually at 
predictive margins for the cohorts we are interested in (i.e. starting with the cohort of 
Economic Boom) (Fig. 5). Even considering the possible exception of the generation of 
Berlusconism and that on the whole citizens belonging to younger generations tend to be less 
likely to become party members than the generation of Economic Boom, the better educated 
(and politically interested) citizens tend to be more, not less likely to participate than people 
with low EI. This gap remains almost constant with younger generations (estimated 
coefficients suggests it might even be larger in two of the younger cohorts). Whilst in terms 
of activists associations, well-educated (and politically interested) citizens tend to participate 
more than citizens with low EI and the gap is similar over generations. If anything can be 
noticed from the figure it is that this gap is minimal and even seems to be smaller in younger 
generations. In order for the CM expectation to be met, however, this gap should be larger 
compared to older generations. 
Once again, this suggest that, overall, the effect of EI on party participation remains positive 
and predominantly constant for each generation after the generation of Economic Boom for 
membership in both association types. This contradicts the CM thesis because, in the case of 
party membership, the effect of education (and political interest) does not become negative in 
younger generations, while in the case of activist membership the likelihood gap of 
participation between high and low EI does not become larger with younger generations. 
These results further suggest that factors other than mass scholarization are also responsible 
for changing participatory trends. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this study was to explore if the process of cognitive mobilization has played a key 
role in shaping organizational participatory trends in traditional political parties and in 
activist associations in Western Europe, taking Italy as a case-study (Inglehart, 1977, 
Inglehart, 1990a, Dalton, 1984 and Dalton, 2002). It has been shown that, at the aggregate 
level, CM seems not to be a key explanation at work for declining levels of party membership 
  
and for increasing levels of activist association membership. Also, looking at the individual 
level relationship of education (and political interest) with different types of organizational 
participation, and accounting for the effect of the change in the educational composition of 
society, CM expectations have not been met in either type of organization. Political party 
membership, although never extremely high in absolute terms, tend to be lower for all 
educational levels, but the effect of education remains positive and constant overall over time 
on the decision to join parties (H2a). If anything, in the last decade there might be an 
indication of a greater decrease for the lower educated than for the higher educated (and more 
politically interested) citizens. Moreover, better-educated (and more politically interested) 
citizens of young cohorts still participate more in political parties than their poorly educated 
counterparts (H2b). This contradicts CM expectations in terms of changing educational 
effects (from positive to negative) on party participation. For activist associations, since the 
1980s (H2a) and after the generation of Economic Boom (H2b), participation is higher for the 
better educated (and politically interested) than for the poorly educated. However, the 
likelihood gap of becoming a member of these organizations between people with high and 
low educational levels does not become larger over time or with belonging to younger 
generations. Rather it tends to stay (statistically) constant. In conclusion, it is still the poorly 
educated of younger generations that participate less in political parties, not the better 
educated as the CM model posits. Thus, the positive effect and larger presence of education 
in society appears to stem rather than fuel the general trend of decreasing participation in 
parties. Simultaneously, as in the past, education is a positive predictor for membership in 
activist associations. However, increasing trends of participation do not seem to be related to 
the larger presence of education in society, since both the poorly and well-educated citizens 
participate more than the past. This leads us to conclude that CM is not the key explanatory 
mechanism at work. 
After having assessed data reliability and validity, and replicated models using more 
conservative tools, it can reasonably be stated that a robust pattern seems to exist in the data 
in the direction of the results presented. This does not necessarily imply any grand 
conclusions on CM. As mentioned, this study investigates only specific aspects of the theory, 
namely the changed relationship between education and participation due to changing 
educational levels in society, in a specific participatory context: the organizational 
participation in political parties and activist associations in Italy. Although unconventional 
modes of participation and social movements are related to the latter, for good reasons, they 
  
have not been the focus of this study and no conclusions can be drawn about them. This study 
nonetheless has a few major implications. 
The first is that the central tenants of the CM thesis need careful re-examination and further 
clarification in literature of the mechanisms through which it should operate. This study has 
presented an initial contribution in this respect. The second is that the relationship between 
education and organizational participation seems not to have changed at the individual level: 
education is still a predictor of more participation in political parties and in activist 
associations, but in the latter case no more than it used to be in the past. The third is that 
serious reflection on the universal adequacy of CM as a key mechanism at work is required, 
together with a widening of perspectives on CM in different directions. As we mentioned 
previously, while CM may not be a comprehensive explanatory theory of changes in 
participatory trends that excludes any other explanation, its advocates argue that it is the 
spread of education and skills in society that played a key role in the participatory change in 
the Western world. What this study's results show is not only that CM, if at work in 
organizational participation in Italy, it is not the key mechanism, but also that mass-education 
has actually been responsible for hampering the decline of party membership while only 
marginally affecting the increase of membership in activist associations. Further studies 
should explore whether this is also the case in other Western countries. 
Although suggesting the directions in which CM literature should expand is beyond the scope 
of this article, it is worth illustrating the changes that the Italian society went through besides 
mass scholarization. This could set the ground for “tentative” hypotheses to be tested in 
future research. One way to look at the results is for instance by applying Converse's (1969) 
ideas on partisan stability to party membership: Partisanship is acquired through 
socialization, and partisan stability tends to accumulate over the adult years. A drop in party 
participation in a country like Italy, which has suffered serious disruptions to the party 
system, might be due to the fact that time is needed in order for membership in new parties to 
increase to similar levels as before the disruption. Therefore, it is possible that CM does work 
in this country, but its effect is swamped by the (temporary) weakening of mobilization of the 
base that follows a major disruption to the political system. Yet, it needs to be noted that 
similar participatory trends to those observed in Italy seem to be affecting other advanced 
industrial democracies that have not undergone drastic changes in the political system (van 
Biezen et al., 2012). 
  
According to a different literature the main cause of decline in participation in political 
parties, in Italy as in other Western Democracies, has been the end in mobilization from 
above, and the slow but constant collapse of political subculture of society that resulted in 
increasing the costs of joining a party (see Katz and Mair, 1995 and Mannheimer and Sani, 
1987). Italian political participation has historically been rooted in the habituation of being 
encapsulated in territorial political subcultures and mobilized from above. First Republic 
parties (before the 1990s) were based on mass cleavage models that allowed lower educated 
citizens to be mobilized (Pasquino, 2001 and Gunther and Diamond, 2003). Following a trend 
in Western countries, with the modernization of society and of political parties, old mass 
parties’ gradually assumed the characteristics of a cartel party, as they became increasingly 
professional and centralized no longer requiring mass mobilization (Katz and Mair, 1995; 
Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000 and Ignazi, 2012). In this sense, in line with previous works on 
“attitudinal partisanship” (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009 and Garzia and Viotti, 2011) another 
theory argues that, as parties move away from society and secondary organizations and 
become more personalized, more cognitively skilled citizens are more likely to be involved in 
ever more “attitudinal” objects like contemporary Italian parties. In conclusion, in addition to 
a change in the educational composition of society, future studies dealing with CM may 
therefore also find it productive to take into account the characteristics of the national 
political context and of the party structure, within a longitudinal cross-country research 
design. The current study has indeed been focussing only on the demand side of participation, 
looking at the characteristics of the citizens, but it should not be forgotten that an offer side of 
participation exists and affects participatory dynamics. A combined focus on citizens and 
political parties, with the changes that both sides have undergone over time, could shed more 
lights on democratic participatory trends. 
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